Pay and Productivity in a Corporatist Economy: Evidence from Austria by Fuess, Scott M., Jr. & Millea, Meghan
University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
Economics Department Faculty Publications Economics Department 
1-2001 
Pay and Productivity in a Corporatist Economy: Evidence from 
Austria 
Scott M. Fuess Jr. 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, SFUESS1@UNL.EDU 
Meghan Millea 
Mississippi State University, mjm51@msstate.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/econfacpub 
 Part of the Economics Commons 
Fuess, Scott M. Jr. and Millea, Meghan, "Pay and Productivity in a Corporatist Economy: Evidence from 
Austria" (2001). Economics Department Faculty Publications. 40. 
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/econfacpub/40 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics Department at DigitalCommons@University 
of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Economics Department Faculty Publications by an 
authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. 
IZA DP No. 244
Pay and Productivity in a Corporatist Economy:
Evidence from Austria
Scott M. Fuess, Jr.
Meghan Millea
D
I
S
C
U
S
S
I
O
N
 P
A
P
E
R
 S
E
R
I
E
S
Forschungsinstitut
zur Zukunft der Arbeit
Institute for the Study
of Labor
January 2001
	



	





	
	










	







Discussion Paper No. 244 
January 2001 
 
 
 
IZA 
 
P.O. Box 7240   
D-53072 Bonn   
Germany   
 
Tel.: +49-228-3894-0  
Fax: +49-228-3894-210   
Email: iza@iza.org 
 
 
 
This Discussion Paper is issued within the framework of IZA’s research area 
 
 


Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of the institute. 
Research disseminated by IZA may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no 
institutional policy positions. 
 
The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research 
center and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an 
independent, nonprofit limited liability company (Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung) 
supported by the Deutsche Post AG. The center is associated with the University of Bonn and 
offers a stimulating research environment through its research networks, research support, and 
visitors and doctoral programs. IZA engages in (i) original and internationally competitive 
research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of policy concepts, and (iii) 
dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public. The current research 
program deals with (1) mobility and flexibility of labor markets, (2) internationalization of labor 
markets and European integration, (3) the welfare state and labor markets, (4) labor markets in 
transition, (5) the future of work, (6) project evaluation and (7) general labor economics. 
 
IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage 
discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. 
IZA Discussion Paper No. 244 
January 2001  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 !"!
	



	


Conventional theory predicts that productivity gains lead to hikes in real pay. Efficiency wage 
theory hypothesizes that pay increases can lead to productivity improvements. But would such 
results be observed in a corporatist economy with centralized bargaining? For the case of 
Austria, a corporatist archetype, this study uses an innovative technique developed by Geweke 
to disentangle the relationship between pay and productivity. There already has been empirical 
evidence that pay demands in corporatist economies are relatively modest. Moreover, it has 
been claimed that corporatist coordination enhances the efficiency of labor contracts, by 
providing a mechanism to adjust to aggregate shocks. Our findings uncover another efficiency 
benefit of corporatism. For laborers in manufacturing, we find that wage hikes result in 
productivity gains. Managers, then, are rewarded following improvements in productivity.  
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1     1For example, see evidence reported by Bean et al. (1986), Bruno and Sachs (1985), Calmfors
and Driffil (1988), Flanagan et al. (1983), Katzenstein (1984), Pichelmann and Wagner (1986),
I.  Introduction and Review
Conventional wage theory predicts that profit-maximizing employers hire labor up to the
point where the marginal product of labor equals the real wage.  Thus, improvements in
productivity will stimulate labor demand and drive up pay.  Influence also can work in the other
direction.  Efficiency wage hypotheses suggest that pay adjustments can improve labor
productivity.  For example, raising pay can stimulate worker effort and solidify long-term
employment relationships (Salop, 1979; Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984).  Akerlof (1982) has
proposed that when firms increase pay, employees work harder out of a sense of loyalty to those
firms.  In a similar vein, Teulings and Hartog (1998, p. 187) have claimed that if wages deviate
from norms of fairness, workers retaliate against employers, meaning there will be a link between
wage norms and labor productivity.    
 Productivity should drive pay; likewise pay can influence productivity.  But what about
in corporatist economy?  Corporatism is usually thought of as economy-wide or otherwise
institutionalized coordination in the wage-setting process.  Such coordination typically involves
government, either because legislation extends union contract terms to nonunion workers or
because labor negotiations must account for government policies.  
Labor settlements in a corporatist economy are affected not so much by market
conditions, but institutional and political considerations.  Consequently, corporatism may stifle
the market mechanism, creating an “institutional sclerosis” (see Flanagan et al., 1983; Olson,
1982).  In response, Calmfors and Driffil (1988) have hypothesized that when there is economy-
wide coordination in wage setting, organized labor must take into account the external effects of
its demands.  Studies have shown that wages in corporatist economies have been responsive to
general market conditions, and that such economies have performed better than others in
containing inflation and unemployment.1  
2Tarantelli (1986), and Teulings and Hartog (1998).
     2On measures of corporatism, see Bruno and Sachs (1985), Calmfors and Driffil (1988), and
Teulings and Hartog (1998, pp. 26-31).
     3For discussion of this identification problem, see Campbell (1993), Cappelli and Chauvin
(1991), and Carmichael (1990).
Despite comparatively flexible wages, in a corporatist setting it is not clear how pay and
productivity will be interrelated.  If organized labor does restrain its demands, it may or may not
expect wages to react to productivity improvements.  Or perhaps settlements to raise pay will
actually stimulate productivity gains.  With centralized wage setting, is pay responsive to
productivity gains?  Do wage increases actually contribute to improvements in productivity?     
There is no consensus about what exactly constitutes corporatism.  Several researchers
have formulated indices, attempting to measure corporatism across countries.2  Although there
are disagreements about these measures, there is consensus that Austria represents the
quintessence of a corporatist economy.  In every index devised, Austria ranks as the most
corporatist country (see Teulings and Hartog, 1998, p. 30).  Each year there is centralized
bargaining between a national union )) representing both “blue-collar” wage earners and “white-
collar” salary earners )) and federation of employers.  Both sides belong to a Parity Commission
for Prices and Wages, which sets national pay policies.  Labor pacts do not have to be ratified at
a local level and settlement terms extend to nonunion workers.  
Considering Austria's corporatist practices, this study investigates the relationship
between pay and productivity in that country.  In so doing we face a basic identification problem,
whether productivity gains are the result or cause of higher pay.3  To overcome this problem we
utilize a statistical technique developed by Geweke (1982, 1984) to assess bi-directional causality
between time series, which we use to disentangle pay-productivity relationships in Austria.  
Geweke has developed measures of statistical feedback which also account for any inter-
dependence between time series, thereby extending Granger's (1969) definition of causality. 
3     4For detailed analysis and discussion of the Geweke method, including economists'
adaptations of the method, see Millea (1998).
     5For example, see Karlhofer and Ladurner (1993), Kindley (1992), Nowotny (1993), and
Pichelmann and Wagner (1986).
     6Thirteen (formerly fifteen) affiliates represent employees in both the private and public
sectors, spanning industries and occupations.  For example, there are separate affiliates for metal
workers, railway workers, private sector salary earners, and so on.  Yet the affiliates are only
subgroups of the ÖGB.  It is the ÖGB itself that coordinates pay claims and settles contracts on
behalf of its affiliates.
Because this method measures feedback while controlling for any instantaneous association, it
can be used to disentangle the direction and magnitude of the linear relationships between two
time series.  Although known to statisticians, economists only recently have incorporated the
method to clarify relationships among variables.4    
Using Austrian time series for the 1954-1995 period, we apply Geweke's linear feedback
technique.  This procedure allows us to measure the extent to which (1) productivity has led
employee earnings and (2) earnings have led productivity, while separately identifying any
simultaneous association between the two series.  We use the Geweke feedback measures to
verify whether pay adjustments indeed have influenced productivity and vice versa.
Data for Austrian manufacturing distinguish between wage earnings of blue-collar
workers and salary earnings of white-collar workers.  Therefore, we can assess how wages or
salaries are related, if at all, to productivity in the economy.  
II.  Setting Pay in Austria
Before attempting to sort out pay and productivity, it is necessary to consider how pay is
set in Austria.  This topic has been detailed elsewhere, so we present only a brief summary.5  
On the labor side, the key party is the Austrian Trade Union Federation (German
acronym:  ÖGB).  The ÖGB monopolizes organized labor in the country, settling labor contracts
on behalf of its affiliates.6  As noted by Karlhofer and Ladurner (1993), approximately three-
4     7Membership in a Chamber of Labour is compulsory for employees, except public servants
and agricultural workers.
     8In an effort to control spiralling inflation after World War II, a number of centralized price-
and-wage accords had been implemented in the late 1940s and early 1950s.
     9The Parity Commission has a subcommittee on wages, which provides continuing review of
the ÖGB's wage management guidelines.
fifths of the labor force belongs to the union federation, but virtually all wage and salary earners
are subject to collective agreements negotiated by the ÖGB.
Virtually all interest groups in Austria are organized in self-governing bodies called
“chambers.”  There are separate groups for farmers, lawyers, physicians, employers, et cetera. 
There are also respective Chambers of Labour, organized into the Federal Chamber of Labour
(acronym:  BAK).7  The BAK provides a forum for labor interests to be voiced in public affairs,
but the power to negotiate pay settlements resides exclusively with the ÖGB.       
On the employer side, numerous chambers represent firms in areas such as commerce,
industry, trade, transport, tourism, and finance, credit, and insurance.  These employer groups
constitute the Federal Economic Chamber (BWK).  
In Austria there is a formal “social partnership” between labor, business, and government. 
This tripartite arrangement has been in place since 1957, when the Parity Commission for Prices
and Wages (Paritätische Kommission für Preis- und Lohnfragen) was established.8  The
commission is the primary pay setting institution in the country.  Its mission is to coordinate
annual labor contracts with government policies, thereby providing institutional control of wages
and prices.  Representing labor on the commission are two delegates each from the ÖGB and
BAK.  On behalf of employers, there are two delegates each from the BWK and the Conference
of Chambers of Agriculture.  Parity Commission decisions can be implemented only by
unanimous vote.9  The commission is chaired by Austria's Federal Chancellor and attended by
5     10Since 1966, government members of the Parity Commission have not had voting rights.
representatives of pertinent government ministries.10  
In guiding pay settlements, the Parity Commission ostensibly takes into account
productivity, solidarity, and the state of the business cycle.  Focusing on the years 1968-1984,
Pichelmann and Wagner (1986) found that pay growth was directly related to productivity
growth.  But that study did not attempt to control for feedback, that is, possible influence of pay
on productivity.  Considering the social solidarity necessary to achieve labor contracts, when pay
hikes actually are granted, workers' efforts may be affected.  Thus, it is necessary to identify how
pay and productivity are interrelated.  
III.  The Geweke Linear Feedback Method:  Overview
Suppose there are two time series vectors prd (productivity) and pay (worker pay). 
Geweke (1982) decomposes linear dependence between the series into three components:  (1)
feedback from prd to pay, (2) feedback from pay to prd, and (3) contemporaneous
(simultaneous) association between the series.  Whereas feedback from productivity to pay is
supportive of conventional labor demand, feedback from pay to productivity illustrates that pay
adjustments influence efficiency.
Consider the following forecasting equations.  A forecast of productivity at time t (prdt)
can be made using past values of productivity (prdt-s) and pay (payt-s):
prdt = Σs=1 α1(s)prdt-s + Σs=1 α2(s)payt-s + η1t,  (1)
where the α's are coefficient vectors and η1t is the random prediction error with variance υ21.
To identify feedback from pay to productivity, Fpay ×prd, we must account for the marginal
contribution of payt-s in the productivity forecast.  So we compare the prdt forecast generated with
the earnings series to a prediction created without the series.  Therefore, we modify equation (1)
and estimate prdt again as follows:
prdt = Σs=1 β1(s)prdt-s + η2t, (2)
6where var(η2t) = υ22.  Feedback from pay to productivity is determined by comparing the
prediction error variances from equations (1) and (2): 
Fpay × prd L log (υ22 / υ21 ). (3)  
If the two variances are the same, then payt-s values do not improve the precision of the
productivity forecast.  That is, if υ22 = υ21, then Fpay × prd = 0 and past pay does not influence
current productivity.  
The interrelationship between pay and productivity is likely to differ according to market
conditions.  The basic feedback method can be extended to include a control variable, which
Geweke (1984) called conditioning information.  Austrian unemployment has risen steadily since
the early 1980s, from 1.9 percent in 1980 to 7.1 percent in 1997.  In earlier years, specifically
1954-1973, unemployment had fallen from 7.6 percent to 1.2 percent.  According to conventional
theory, a productivity improvement will induce a pay raise.  Presumably, pay will not be as
responsive when unemployment has been rising, as it has in recent years.  Similarly, any
efficiency consequences of pay adjustments are likely to be different when unemployment is
climbing.  Thus, our feedback measures control for unemployment by including past
unemployment rates, urt-s, in the productivity forecasts:  
 prdt = Σs=1 a1 (s)prdt-s + Σs=1 a2 (s)payt-s + Σs=1 a3 (s)urt-s + …1t, (4)
prdt = Σs=1 b1 (s)prdt-s + Σs=1 b2 (s)urt-s + …2t,  (5)
where var (…it) = σ2i.  Conditional feedback from pay to productivity is simply given by
Fpay ×prd|ur L log (σ22 / σ21 ). (6)
Controlling for unemployment, if past pay does not influence current productivity, then
Fpay ×prd|ur = 0.  
Estimating conditional feedback from productivity to pay follows a similar process.  We
estimate payt as a function of past earnings, productivity, and unemployment:
payt = Σs=1 a4(s)payt-s + Σs=1 a5(s)prdt-s + Σs=1 a6(s)urt-s + …3t, (7)
where …3t is the prediction error with variance σ23.  To isolate the marginal impact of the
7productivity observations, we also estimate payt without the productivity series:
payt = Σs=1 b3(s)payt-s + Σs=1 b4(s)urt-s + …4t,  (8)
with var(…4t) = σ24.  From equations (8) and (7), feedback from productivity to pay is    
Fprd ×pay|ur L log (σ24 / σ23 ). (9)  
Recapping, equations (4-6) illustrate the influence of past pay on the forecast of
productivity.  Likewise equations (7-9) show the role of past values of productivity on pay.  
A distinguishing feature of the Geweke method is that it also accounts for any
contemporaneous association between two series, that is, linear association that cannot be
disentangled.  To identify this simultaneous component, we modify the forecast of prdt by also
including current pay:      
prdt = Σs=1 c1(s)prdt-s + Σs=0 c2(s)payt-s + Σs=1 c3(s)urt-s + …5t,  (10)
where var(…5t) = σ25.  Including current earnings may improve the forecast's precision. Thus, the
measure of contemporaneous association is defined as
Fpay •prd|ur L log (σ21 / σ25 ). (11)
If including current pay does not reduce the prediction error, then σ25 = σ21 and Fpay •prd|ur = 0,
which means there is no contemporaneous association between the series.
Given the different types of feedback, we can now disentangle pay and productivity.  The
feedback measure Fprd ×pay|ur indicates whether productivity leads worker earnings, which would
be consistent with conventional labor demand.  The measure Fpay ×prd|ur shows whether pay leads
productivity, that is, whether there are efficiency consequences from pay adjustments.  Finally,
Fpay •prd|ur shows the extent of simultaneity between pay and prd.  
The feedback measures defined above can be transformed using the formula [1 - exp(-F)]. 
For example, transforming Fpay ×prd|ur shows the proportional reduction in the prediction error
variance of prdt that can be attributed to past values payt-s, conditional on unemployment.  In
other words, the transformation illustrates the capacity of past earnings to reduce the variance of
prediction error in the productivity forecast.
8     11Unemployment is not stationary in levels-form but the first-difference is stationary.  On the
unemployment observations, see the data appendix. 
IV.   Disentangling Pay and Productivity:  Geweke Feedback Measures
Implementing the Geweke Method.  The Geweke linear feedback method can be
implemented to provide measures of feedback between pay and productivity in Austria.  The
Austrian Central Statistical Office (ÖSZ) reports only one measure of labor productivity:  Real
GDP per gainfully employed person, which is available from 1954 through 1997 (for details, see
the data appendix).  
The ÖSZ reports yearly gross earnings (schillings per month) per employee.  So we can
assess the interrelationship between employee earnings and labor productivity economy-wide. 
Unfortunately, the aggregated earnings data do not distinguish between wage earnings of blue-
collar workers and salary earnings of white-collar employees.  In a statistical compendium
documenting the first fifty years of Austria's current republic, 1945-1995, the ÖSZ reported
disaggregated figures for wage and salary earnings in the manufacturing sector (see data
appendix).  For 1954-1995 we can analyze the interrelationship, if any, between manufacturing
wages and productivity overall; likewise, we can assess any association between productivity and
white-collar salaries in manufacturing.           
The productivity and pay series are expressed in real terms.  To implement the Geweke
method, the forecast equations must be estimated with stationary time series, otherwise
estimations may be subject to spurious correlation.  We employed the Dickey-Fuller (1981) unit
root test for stationarity.
One may wish to use productivity and pay levels to estimate the projection equations. 
But for the prd and pay series in levels, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of nonstationarity. 
The first-differences of these series, however, are stationary.  Thus in implementing the Geweke
method, we used prd*t L (prdt - prdt-1) and pay*t L (payt - payt-1), which reflect changes in
productivity and pay, respectively.11
9     12In the various forecast equations, the optimal lag length was either one (using employee
earnings overall as the pay variable) or two (using earnings from the manufacturing sector). 
Details are available from the authors upon request.
     13The adjusted feedback point estimates do not have associated test statistics, meaning there is
no procedure for direct hypothesis testing.  Following the simulation process of Cushing and
McGarvey (1990), we can construct bands to indicate the potential magnitude of the feedback
measures.  For details, see the technical appendix.
To obtain the prd*t and pay*t forecasts, we used OLS regression.12  Then we computed the
conditional feedback measures Fprd* ×pay**ur*, Fpay* ×prd**ur*, and Fpay* •prd**ur*.  The feedback
estimators are consistent, but because they are based on variances they are nonnegative by
construction and potentially biased upward in small samples.  Following the method developed
by Cushing and McGarvey (1990), we adjusted the point estimates for small sample bias and
then created 90-percent confidence bands for each estimator.13
Conditional Feedback Results.  With earnings, productivity, and unemployment series,
we estimated forecasts for prd*t and pay*t.  Taking the prediction error variances from these
forecasts, we computed conditional feedback point estimates, adjusted each one for small sample
bias, and created 90-percent confidence bands.  Using [1 - exp(-F)], we transformed the adjusted
feedback measures and associated confidence bands, which allows us to gauge the rate of change
in the prediction error variance of a forecast.
Table 1 reports conditional feedback measures using employee earnings overall as the pay
variable.  According to the point estimates, there is not much feedback between prd* and pay*
economy-wide.  Past productivity changes barely influence earnings growth.  The prediction
error variance of pay*t is reduced by only 1.3 percent when including prd*t-s.  Likewise,
conditional feedback from prd* to pay* is slight, 2.2 percent.  Moreover, there is hardly any
contemporaneous association (1.2 percent) between earnings and productivity changes.  
Although the feedback point estimates are modest, the confidence intervals are very wide
(see Table 1), suggesting that any outcome could be possible.  Such a finding might not be
10
surprising considering that the pay variable accounts for both the wages of blue-collar workers
and salaries collected by white-collar workers.  For the manufacturing sector, it is possible to
distinguish between wage (wg) and salary (sl) earnings.  Consequently, it may be useful to
evaluate Geweke feedback measures using the less aggregated earnings series from
manufacturing.
 Table 2 presents the conditional feedback measures for manufacturing, with results for
wage earners in Panel A and findings for salaried employees in Panel B.  In one respect the blue-
and white-collar findings are similar:  There is quite a bit of simultaneity between pay and
productivity changes (see third column of Table 2).  Nevertheless, there are meaningful
differences between wage and salary earners.           
Consider the efficiency effects of pay adjustments (second column of table).  Focusing on
blue-collar workers, changes in wage earnings lead changes in productivity, which is consistent
with efficiency wage setting.  Past wage adjustments improve the prd*t forecast error variance by
7.3 percent, possibly much more, with the confidence interval reaching 57.0 percent.  Efficiency
wage contracting cannot be ruled out for Austrian manufacturing, at least for blue-collar workers. 
Apparently efficiency pay has not extended to white-collar employees, for the conditional
feedback point estimate is merely 0.2 (confidence interval only reaches 6.0).               
Turning to the impact of productivity on pay, so-called conventional labor demand, again
there are differences between types of employees (first column of Table 2).  Salary earnings are
more responsive than wages to productivity.  For blue-collar workers, changes in overall
productivity do not lead changes in wage earnings.  The conditional feedback measure is a scant
0.7 percent.  For white-collar employees, in contrast, past productivity changes lead salary
adjustments.  The feedback point estimate is 4.4 percent, with the confidence interval showing
that prd*t-s improves the sl*t forecast by as much as 29.0 percent.
Our results distinguish between different types of pay practices across different types of
workers.  Pay adjustments for manufacturing laborers lead changes in productivity; productivity
11
     14Instead of efficiency wage behavior, perhaps manufacturing employers reacted to wage
growth by implementing new technology or otherwise boosting capital-labor ratios, which might
explain labor productivity gains.  According to the impulse response function depicted in Panel A
of the figure, the labor productivity gain occurs immediately after an innovation in pay, wearing
off quickly thereafter.  It is unlikely that employers have been able to adjust capital-labor ratios
instantly following labor settlements.  In heavy manufacturing substantial changes in the quantity
changes lead salary adjustments for managers.  But strictly speaking, we have not verified that
wage increases have had a positive impact on productivity or that productivity gains have led to
higher salaries.  To confirm the former, we can trace out the reaction of a productivity sequence
to a wage stimulus.  For the latter, we trace out the reaction of a salary sequence to an innovation
in productivity.   
V.  Clarifying the Geweke Feedback Measures:  Impulse Response Analysis
The impulse response method developed by Sims (1980) is commonly used to illustrate
the response of one time series to an innovation in another series.  With the feedback measure
Fwg*×prd**ur* for wage earners, we implemented the Sims technique to illustrate the response of a
productivity series to an innovation in the wage series.  A positive prd* response to a wg*
innovation would confirm that a wage hike results in better labor productivity.  Measures of the
prd* responses are simply point estimates; we also used the standard errors of the impulse
responses to construct a 90-percent significance interval for the estimates.     
A graph of the impulse response function and the confidence interval appears in Figure 1,
Panel A.  Over the sample period, the year-on-year increase in output per employed person
averaged approximately 8,500 schillings (measured in 1983 prices).  As shown in the graph,
there is a strongly positive productivity reaction to a wage innovation.  According to the point
estimates, the gain in real productivity increases )) by nearly 2,000 schillings )) immediately
following a wg* impulse.  Likewise, the lower bound for the significance interval is positive for
the first year after the innovation.  Such a finding is supportive of efficiency wage contracting:  A
wage hike for manufacturing laborers does indeed result in a productivity improvement.14 
12
or quality of capital can take years to implement and are difficult to reverse.  If the capital-labor
explanation were to hold, productivity improvement probably would occur after some periods
had passed and not decay as quickly.
Turning to the feedback measure Fprd*×sl**ur*, we implemented the Sims technique to show
how the salary series reacts to a one-standard-deviation innovation in the productivity series.  A
positive sl* response to a prd* innovation would confirm that improvement in productivity
increases salary gains.  A graph of that impulse response function and the confidence interval
appears in Panel B of Figure 1.  
Better productivity overall leads to a bigger salary hike for manufacturing managers. 
Over the sample period, the year-on-year increase in salary averaged nearly 500 schillings per
month (measured in 1983 prices).  According to the impulse point estimates, the salary hike
improves by 100 schillings following a prd* impulse, tapering off thereafter.  Likewise, the lower
bound for the significance interval is positive for the first two periods after the innovation. 
Salary hikes for manufacturing managers follow improvements in productivity.  Whereas wage
earners are subject to efficiency wage setting, salaried employees evidently are rewarded
according to past performance, which is consistent with conventional labor demand. 
 VI.  Summary of Results and Concluding Remarks
Conventional theory predicts that productivity gains lead to hikes in real pay.  Efficiency
wage theory hypothesizes that pay increases can lead to productivity improvements.  But would
these results be observed in a corporatist economy?  It has been alleged that coordinated wage
bargaining thwarts the labor market because agreements rely too much on political consensus. 
But there is a counter that such coordination makes pay claims more moderate and flexible.  
For the case of Austria, a corporatist archetype, this study has used an innovative
technique developed by Geweke (1982, 1984) to examine the interrelationship between earnings
and productivity.  For the 1954-1995 sample period, we used the Geweke method to disentangle
the linear association between manufacturing wage/salary changes and productivity gains, while
13
controlling for contemporaneous association.  
Earlier empirical evidence indicates that pay demands in corporatist economies are
relatively modest.  Moreover, Teulings and Hartog (1998) hypothesize that corporatist co-
ordination enhances the efficiency of labor contracts, by providing a mechanism to adjust to
aggregate shocks.  Our findings uncover another efficiency benefit of corporatism.  
In an environment in which union wage demands have been restrained, agreement to raise
wages may have a propitious effect, improving morale and workers' efforts, thereby benefitting
productivity.  Indeed, we find that wage increases in manufacturing result in productivity gains. 
In contrast, managerial salary raises have no impact on productivity.  Managers, however, are
rewarded following overall improvements in productivity.  
The intensity of managerial supervision is greater in Austria than many other European
countries (Gordon, 1994).  Now we may be able to clarify why this has been case.  Boosting the
wages of blue-collar workers )) who are under fairly close supervision )) results in productivity
improvements, in turn, yielding salary gains for those supervising managers.            
It remains to be seen whether our findings for Austria extend to other corporatist
countries.  Furthermore, it remains to be seen where, and under what type(s) of supervisory
conditions, there may be a similar pay-productivity dichotomy between managers and laborers. 
As future research concentrates on such issues, we expect the interrelationship between pay and
productivity to be clarified further.       
14
Data Appendix
Productivity.  Real labor productivity is represented by real GDP per gainfully employed
person, measured in 1983 schillings per year.  
For 1954-1994, real GDP per gainfully employed person is reported in [1, see “Data
References” below], Table 15.06, p. 222 (figures in 1976 and 1964 prices converted to 1983
schillings using the 1983 real GDP deflator).  For 1995-1997, real productivity growth rates were
available in [4], Table 15.07, p. 274; then we calculated productivity figures for 1995-1997.  
 Earnings.  Nominal gross earnings per employee, measured in schillings per month, is
reported for 1954-1994 in [1], Table 15.04, p. 220.  For 1995-1997, nominal gross earnings
growth was available in [4], Table 15.06, p. 273; then we calculated earnings figures for 1995-
1997.
To obtain real gross earnings per employee, we divided nominal earnings by the 1983
GDP deflator.  The GDP deflator is simply nominal GDP divided by real GDP.  
For 1954-1995, nominal and real GDP (measured in billions of schillings) can be found
in [1], Table 15.01, pp. 213-214.  For 1995-1997, there are nominal and real GDP growth rates in
[4], Tables 15.01 and 15.02, pp. 266-269, which we used to calculate figures for nominal and real
GDP, respectively.
Figures for gross nominal monthly earnings (schillings per month) per wage earner, salary
earner, and employee (which combines wage and salary earners) in manufacturing for 1954-1993
are reported in [2], Table 4.4, p. 104.  Observations for 1994-1995 can be found in [3], Table
9.07, p. 157.  To calculate real earnings, we divided nominal earnings by the 1983 GDP deflator.
Unemployment.  Unemployment rates for 1954-1993 were provided to the authors, see
[5].  Figures for 1984-1997 can be found in [4], Table 7.03, p. 164.  
Data References.
1.  Österreichisches Statistisches Zentralamt.  1995.  Statistisches Jahrbuch für die
Republik Österreich 1995.  Wien: Österreichisches Statistisches Zentralamt.  [Translation: 
15
Austrian Central Statistical Office.  Statistical Yearbook for the Republic of Austria 1995. 
Vienna:  Austrian Central Statistical Office.]
2.  _____.  1995.  Republik Österreich 1945-1995.  Wien:  Österreichisches Statistisches
Zentralamt.  [Translation:  Republic of Austria 1945-1995.  Vienna:  Austrian Central Statistical
Office.] 
3.  _____.  1996.  Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Republik Österreich 1996.  Wien:
Österreichisches Statistisches Zentralamt.  [Translation:  Statistical Yearbook for the Republic of
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Technical Appendix
Small Sample Bias Correction and Construction of Confidence Bands.  Geweke linear
feedback measures are based on prediction error variances, the latter of which are nonnegative. 
To correct for potential small sample bias, we simulated a sampling distribution for each
feedback measure and obtain the mean, the fifth- and ninety-fifth centiles.  Following the
procedure used by Cushing and McGarvey (1990), we used the mean to adjust each feedback
point estimate.  To indicate the potential magnitude of the adjusted estimate, we used the upper
and lower centiles to create 90-percent confidence bands.  
Correcting the conditional feedback measures involves the following steps.  Taking 
equations (4) and (7), we estimated a tri-variate autoregressive (AR) system.  With the 
estimated coefficient matrix that resulted, we simulated observations according to
~          ~     
B(L)Wt = et, where et ~ N(0, Ω) (A1)
       ~ 
and B(L) is the estimated coefficient matrix of the tri-variate AR system, Wt is the data matrix
                    ~ 
(containing prd*, pay*, and ur* observations), and Ω is the estimated variance of the conditional
system.  The lag length used in the simulated AR system, equation (A1), is the same as that used
to generate the feedback measures.  The simulated data are then used to generate feedback
measures and the sampling distribution of the feedback point estimates.
There are ki estimates of type i feedback calculated from the simulations (i = 1, 2, 3,
where the three types of feedback are Fpay* ×prd**ur*, Fprd* ×pay**ur*, and Fpay* •prd**ur* ).  These sets of
ki estimates provide the sampling distribution of the estimator, fi, given the “population,” that is,
the actual data.  Following Cushing and McGarvey, we simulated 200 estimates (ki = 200) to
create sampling distributions for each of the feedback measures.  
The simulated mean, E(fi), fifth centile, Ci5, and ninety-fifth centile, Ci95, of the feedback
sampling distribution can be used to adjust the feedback measures.  Let li L Ci5 / E(fi), ui L 
Ci95 / E(fi), and ai L Fi / E(fi), where Fi is the unadjusted population feedback measure.  With 90-
17
percent probability, fi lies between Ci5 and Ci95:
Pr{ liE(fi) < fi < uiE(fi) } = 0.90. (A2)
To adjust the estimates for small sample bias, multiply equation (A2) through by ai:
Pr{ ailiE(fi ) < aifi < aiuiE(fi) } = 0.90, (A3)  
where aifi is the adjusted, unbiased estimator of Fi.  Consequently, we can write
Pr{ liFi < aifi < uiFi } = Pr{ aifi / ui < Fi < aifi / li } = 0.90. (A4)
Assuming that ai, li, and ui are averages of the parameters of the sampling distributions of
fi, the 90-percent confidence band for Fi is
fiai / ui < Fi < fiai / li, (A5)
where fi is a feedback point estimate.  This procedure ensures that the adjusted point estimate of
the feedback, aifi, always falls within the confidence band.  
Applying the adjustment method to the transformed feedback measures, the proportional
reduction in forecast error variance for each conditional feedback measure has a 90-percent
confidence interval defined as:
{1 - exp[-(fiai) / ui ]} < [1 - exp(-Fi)] < {1 - exp[-(fiai) / li]}. (A6)
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Table 1
Disentangling Employee Earnings and Productivity, 1954-1997:
Geweke Conditional Linear Feedback Measuresa
______________________________________________________________________________
Percent Reduction in the Prediction Error Variance of 
Employee Earnings and Productivity Forecasts:
Adjusted Point Estimates  (90-Percent Confidence Bands)
______________________________________________________________________________
Employees overall
Feedback Measuresb             Fprd* ×pay**ur* Fpay* ×prd**ur * Fpay* •prd**ur*
   
    1.28      2.22      1.22
                      (0.35, 93.51)            (0.71, 89.03)            (0.32, 96.68)
______________________________________________________________________________
aFor the earnings, productivity, and unemployment data, see the data appendix.
bConditional feedback from productivity to employee earnings, Fprd* ×pay**ur*, see equations (7-9).  
Conditional feedback from employee earnings to productivity, Fpay* ×prd**ur*, see equations (4-6).  
Conditional contemporaneous association between employee earnings and productivity, 
Fpay* •prd**ur*, see equations (4, 10-11).  In all cases, pay*t L(payt - payt-1); prd*t L(prdt - prdt-1); 
ur*t L(urt - urt-1).
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Table 2
Disentangling Manufacturing Salary/Wage Earnings and Productivity, 1954-1995:
Geweke Conditional Linear Feedback Measuresa
______________________________________________________________________________
Percent Reduction in the Prediction Error Variance of 
Salary /Wage and Productivity Forecasts:
Adjusted Point Estimates  (90-Percent Confidence Bands)
______________________________________________________________________________
Panel A:  Wage earners 
Feedback Measuresb             Fprd* ×wg**ur* Fwg* ×prd**ur * Fwg* •prd**ur*
   
    0.67      7.26    20.89
                      (0.26, 13.93)            (2.79, 56.98)            (8.27, 99.84)
______________________________________________________________________________
Panel B:  Salary earners 
Feedback Measuresc             Fprd* ×sl**ur* Fsl* ×prd**ur * Fsl* •prd**ur*
   
    4.37      0.23    24.32
                      (2.08, 29.04)            (0.07, 5.98)            (9.78, 99.91)
______________________________________________________________________________
 
aFor the salary, wage, productivity, and unemployment data, see the data appendix.
bConditional feedback from productivity to wage earnings, Fprd* ×wg**ur*, see equations (7-9).  
Conditional feedback from wage earnings to productivity, Fwg* ×prd**ur*, see equations (4-6).  
Conditional contemporaneous association between wage earnings and productivity, Fwg* •p**ur*, 
see equations (4, 10-11).  In all cases, wg*t L(wgt - wgt-1); prd*t L(prdt - prdt-1); ur*t L(urt - urt-1).  
cConditional feedback from productivity to salary earnings, Fprd* ×sl**ur*, see equations (7-9).  
Conditional feedback from salary earnings to productivity, Fsl* ×prd**ur*, see equations (4-6).  
Conditional contemporaneous association between salary earnings and productivity, Fsl* •prd**ur*, 
see equations (4, 10-11).  In all cases, sl*t L(slt - slt-1); prd*t L(prdt - prdt-1); ur*t L(urt - urt-1). 
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Figure 1:
Impulse Response Functions
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